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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CPLR 3121(a): Movant need not prove his case on the merits
in order to obtain physical examination of his adversary.
In Constantine v. Diello,0 s the fourth department further
clarified the words "in controversy" as contained in CPLR 3121 (a)'s
statement of when a physical or mental examination may be employed
as a disclosure device. 1° 9 The case involved a wrongful death
action arising from an automobile accident. At a prior motor
vehicle hearing, defendant testified, inter alia, that his vision was
unobstructed. An eye test conducted at the hearing disclosed that
defendant's vision was, in fact, impaired. Subsequently, plaintiff
sought to obtain an eye examination of the defendant in prosecution
of her wrongful death action. In denying defendant's motion for
a protective order, the court held that plaintiff's proof was sufficient
to warrant the granting of her notice for an eye examination, i.e.,
that plaintiff had sufficiently placed the condition of defendant's
vision in controversy.
In support of its holding, the court stated that the requirement
of proof in a 3121 situation is not to be equated with that which
is necessary to make out a prima facie case. Apparently, the
requirement is that there be "some evidence" in order to place a
matter in controversy.
It should be noted, however, that to place an adversary's phy-
sical or mental condition in controversy requires at least that there
be some logical connection between the party's condition and the
issue(s) of the case. Thus, where a defendant stated at an examina-
tion before trial that he had not seen the injured plaintiff, the
court denied plaintiff's request for a physical examination, holding
such a statement insufficient for purposes of placing defendant's
physical condition in controversy. 10
ARTICLE 32 - ACCERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3211(a)(4): Dismissal denied where pending action was
instituted subsequent to the action sought to be dismissed.
In Izquierdo v. Cities Ser. Oil Co.,' the supreme court denied
defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
108 24 App. Div. 2d 821, 264 N.Y.S.2d 153 (4th Dep't 1965).
109 Fisher v. Fossett, 45 Misc. 2d 757, 257 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1965), decided by a lower court within the fourth department, also
discussed the meaning of the words "in controversy." This case is treated in
The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 40 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 122, 161
(1965).
110 Courtney v. Olsen, 45 Misc. 2d 283, 256 N.Y.S2d 748 (Sup. Ct. West-
chester County 1965).11147 Misc. 2d 1087, 264 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1965).
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there was another action pending at the same time. The
second action was instituted in federal court twenty-five days after
the instant case was commenced. The court held that in order to
obtain such a dismissal, the other action must have been commenced
prior to the action in which the motion is made. Although this
seems to be the first such holding under CPLR 3211(a) (4), it
merely restates the rule which prevailed under the CPA.: 2
CPLR 3213.: Defects in moving papers.
Under CPLR 3213, a plaintiff suing on a "judgment or
instrument for the payment of money only" may serve a notice of
motion for summary judgment and supporting papers with the
summons in lieu of a complaint. This procedure provides a means
of securing a speedy judgment on claims which are "presumptively
meritorious. 11 3  The ordinary requirement of a formal complaint
and answer are deemed superfluous and needlessly time consuming.
If the motion is denied, the motion papers are treated as the plead-
ings unless the court orders otherwise."x4
In Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Wisrter,"15 the appellate term,
first department, reversed, with leave to renew, a motion granting
plaintiff summary judgment because of defects in the moving papers
and summons. Aside from amendable irregularities in the sum-
mons, one defect noted by the court was the absence of an authen-
ticating certificate required by CPLR 2309(c) from plaintiff's
supporting affidavit. Thus, because of plaintiff's failure to have
the "flag" attached to its affidavit, it was not properly before the
court."
86
Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to allege its corporate status
pursuant to the requirements of CPLR 3015(b). It would appear,
however, that it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to have amended
this defect. While upon motion the supporting papers must contain
all of the essentials of a complaint, the omission of the allegation
of corporate status in a formal complaint, if non-prejudicial, is
usually ignored. 1 7 Thus, the court might have ignored the defect
312 Avery v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 230 App. Div. 519, 245 N.Y. Supp.
362 (1st Dep't 1930); 4 WNSTEmN, Koax & MiiLEF, NEw Yomu CiVIL
PRAcTicE 321127 (1965).
113 4 WEmN , Kom & MI.Tz,, NEw YoRK CiVIm P1R4cricE 1 3213.01(1965).
114 McKinney's Sess. Laws (Leg. Mem.) 2058 (1965).
115 48 Misc. 2d 275, 264 N.Y.S2d 850 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1965).
316 See Majestic Co. v. Wender, 24 Misc. 2d 1018, 205 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup.
Ct Nassau County 1960).
117 7B MclnTNEY's CPLR 3015, supp. commentary 82 (1965) ; 7B McKIN-
NE;Y's CPLR 3026, supp. commentary 130 (1965); see Foley v. D'Agostino,
21 App. Div. 2d 60, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dep't 1964); Capital Newspapers
Div.-The Hearst Corp. v. Vanderbilt, 44 Misc. 2d 542, 254 N.Y.S.2d 309
